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The explorative study by the author found out that the current literature still needs to explore 
the relationship between the number of complaints filed at the WTO and the financial and 
economic state of the WTO member countries. The explorative study categorized the WTO 
member countries into four categories based on their activeness at the WTO platform. The 
study provided conceptual models to show the theoretical possibility of causality between the 
complaints at the WTO and financial and  economic variables at the macro level. It used a 
quantitative model  to test the model and to find the extent of causality between various 
financial and  economic factors and the aggregate level trade complaints for the most active 
nations at the WTO. 
The World Trade organization, henceforth WTO, with the 159 member countries and 25 
observers champions the cause of trade liberalization. It discourages unfair practices, such as 
export subsidies. The WTO also facilitates the necessary organizational infrastructure for the 
members who perceive that their trade partner countries do not keep to the trade agreement.  
The study results show that the aggregate number of complaints lodged by the most active 
WTO member countries  can be explained in eighty percent cases at 0.01 confidence level by 
the three variables: intellectual property rights(IPR), the net foreign direct investment and the 
percentage of population with structural unemployment..  
The purpose of this paper is to extend this cross section analysis for the most inactive 
countries at the WTO and to check whether the extent of causality applies also to these 
countries.  To support the cross section analysis a time series model is built in four countries, 
U.S.A, Canada, Japan, and the EU respectively. 
 
The results show out that it is not just the cross section country analysis, which shows a very 
strong regression results with 0.85 regression coefficient but also for most active countries. 
The Gross Domestic product (GDP) shows in most cases a negative correlation with the 
aggregate number of complaints and  the IPR positive relationship. The study fits a model 
with an inverted U relationship between GDP and the aggregate number of complaints, a 
double inverted U pattern in the net terms of trade and the aggregate number of complaints. 
The complaints at the WTO are not random, but can be correlated. The study concludes that 
this gives some evidence that ensuring justice for free trade at the Disupte Settlement 
Unit(DSU) is perhaps too idealistic because the DSU complaints are dependent on the macro 
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There is a consensus among the economists about the role of open economy in economic 
growth. The trade liberalization which results more in the export promotion strategy rather 
than import substitution strategy has proven a key to the economic growth. Free trade is an 
economic ideal where there are no trade barriers of any kind, monetary or non-monetary. Free 
trade has multiple arrays of effects; The trade relations create mutual interdependency. The 
interdependency helps to promote the understanding for each other. In the long term the free 
trade  ensures the winning  to all stakeholders. With this basic ideology and many other 
factors led to the foundation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. The member countries 
are expected to understand the principles of multilateral trade and adhere to the principles. 
The complete removal of the trade barriers is perhaps far-fetched, but the transparency about 
the barriers, which are allowed under the multilateral trade treaty, is desired and intended.   
The trade justice forum of the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Unit (DSU) offers the 
opportunity to trade partners to lodge a complaint in pursuit of free trade. The lodging of a 
complaint at the WTO involves complex procedures to seek the trade justice at this WTO 
forum, with causation running one way at the international level. The membership of the 
WTO opens the door to the multilateral trade. A member country gets an opportunity to 
improve its intensive as well as extensive margins of trade. There could be some changes 
taking place in the traditional sector, giving its way to the newly founded sector. This could 
lead subsequently to the some effects in the industrial balance or in the employment pattern in 
the home country. 
 
 
The complaints at the WTO are an innovative way of the WTO to ensure the free trade. It 
preserves the rights and obligations of Members under the CA  under Art 3.2 DSU (WTO 
handbook on dispute settlement 2011)  A WTO member country may lodge complaints 
against its trade partner WTO member country in case it perceives a breach of a multilateral 
agreement. An example of such trade complaint is a complaint by the Indonesia against the 
USA. When in 2009 USA signed a law prohibiting the production and sales of cigarettes with 
additives, Indonesia requested in 2010 a consultation with the USA challenging its ban on 
cigarettes with additives like cloves.The Indonesia perceived this breach of a multilateral 
trade agreement inconsistent with one of the articles and provisions of GATT, made use of the 
WTO platform.  
 
The WTO has a very rigorous and complex procedure for filing the complaints. It requires 
data, information and involves paper work to prove that there is an alleged breach of a 
multilateral agreement. This also ensures that the complaints are independent of the 
perception of the trading partner and dependent factors.  
  
The study proposes that the complaints are used as a tool to satisfy the unrest among a certain 
industrial lobby or the inhabitants or group of displaced labor to show the willingness to serve 
the own country. The financial and  economic variables at the macro level are also indicators 
for the government, which they use to lodge a complaint. The Dispute settlement unit serves 
as a forum for the WTO members to file a complaint. The process is an outcome to ensure the 
free trade, that there are no obstacles. The trade indicators serve as an indicator 
There are thirty countries, which have been complaining and have been respondents to the 
complaints by their trading partners. This small group of WTO active countries, which 
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consists of countries of various sizes and at different stages of economic growth, represents 
the different continent except the continent of Africa.  
After building a conceptual model 
There is ample theoretical guidance on normative questions whether and how much trade 
liberalization should be sought. The empirical interest in trade liberalization and 
protectionism is not new. 
First, Grossman and Helpman (1995) uncovered a positive pattern of lobby support and 
protectionism in the United States of America, prompting researcher to explore whether the 
same was true of other sectors and other countries. Second, the trade justice forum of the 
WTO, the Dispute Settlement Unit (DSU) offers the opportunity to trade partners to lodge a 
complaint in pursuit of free trade. The lodging of a complaint at the WTO involves complex 
procedures to seek the trade justice at this WTO forum, with causation running one way at the 
international level. Third, a wave of recent empirical work has questioned traditional views on 
the protectionism challenging the notion that WTO membership is a prerequisite to the growth 
in trade (Rose 2004). This strand of literature has uncovered insignificant growth gains related 
to the decision of the membership of the WTO owing to the regional trade blocks. Thus, the 
current understanding of the WTO membership and trade growth nexus draws on several 
theoretical and empirical literatures. This paper’s objective is to answer the basic question 
about the nexus between the WTO complaints and the financial and  economic variables at the 
macro level. This objective is the first step to unravel the possibly protectionist impact of the 
WTO complaints on the complaining country   
 
Based on the objective of the paper the question which is addressed in the paper 
 “What is the  quantitative relationship between the number of complaints lodged at the DSU 
and the financial and  economic variables at the macro level of the complaining countries`` 
 
The conceptual framework integrates the links from the empirical literature in the field of 
political economy, the WTO mechanism and the impact of WTO on the trade. 
It takes into account to model for WTO complaints and financial and  economic variables at 
the macro level and the sales for protection theory with a WTO framework for trade justice. 
 
Conceptual model and its explanation 
The first link shows the influences on the determination of trade policy through the lobbies. 
The roots of this link lie among others in the theory formed in the paper ‘Protection for sale’ 
by Grossman and Helpman (1994). This theory has been proven empirically by among others 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Subramanian and Wei (1999), Gawande and Bandopadhyay 
(2000), and Eicher and Osang (2002). They have proven that endogenous factors like import 
demand elasticity, capitalist lobby activity and the import penetration ratio determine the trade 
policy. Matschke, Sherlund (2006) widened the scope of this model by showing that trade 
union activity and labour mobility also play important role in the determination of US trade 
policy. Ederington and Minier (2008) eased the original model by showing that when the 
political factors are taken into account in the government’s objective function, the sign of the 
correlation between trade and import penetration is no longer conditional on the classification 
of industries into organized and unorganized. Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2012) 
modified the original Grossman and Helpman model to account for cross-sectoral use of 
inputs with counter lobbying, which defined the importance of competing lobby forces in the 
determination of trade policy.  
To sum up this first link; the trade policy is a function of many endogenous factors. The 
second link represents the WTO ideal devised to pursue an ideal of free trade. It shows the 
path that a WTO member country is expected to resort to in case of a perceived breach by 
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another WTO member country. The WTO recognizes that WTO complaint procedure is full 
of complex rules and procedures (Article 20 of WTO DSU). The Dispute settlement body 
(henceforth DSB) serves as a platform to ensure the cause of free trade.  
 
The literature shows that this WTO ideal path not necessarily be the norm as Horn, Maggi and 
Staiger (2010) conclude that the trade contracts as such are incomplete documents and that the 
DSB has an important task of completing the incomplete agreements. The empirical evidence 
provided by Bagwell and Staiger (2011) shows that negotiated tariff levels at the WTO 
depend upon the pre-negotiated data related to tariff, import volume and prices and the trade 
elasticity. These studies also mention that the condition under which a country has been 
acceded to the WTO has varied across the time and so has the necessary changes been that a 
country needed to undergo in order to accede to the WTO. Moreover, the idea that formations 
of strategic trade barriers to retort a foreign protection is not new (Gawande, 1997). These 
studies provide some clue that the WTO member countries have unequal bargaining power.  
The link 3 in this conceptual model shows the WTO accession effects on the trade of a WTO 
member country. Rose (2004) questioned the impact of the WTO after he tested the 
assumption that the WTO increases trade and arrived to a negative conclusion. He upheld and 
defended his view subsequently in 2007 and 2010 with marginal concessions to the positive 
findings by others like Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007). The controversy about the extent 
of actual impact and the direction of the impact owing to the WTO accession is beyond the 
scope of this study. Table 2 provides an overview of the studies conducted to assess and 
measure the impact of the WTO. These effects are visible to everyone, including the 
competing lobbyist and trade unions in a country when they surface up in the form of various 
trade profile indicators. These indicators are subject to changes in endogenous and exogenous 
factors. The WTO accession is one of most important exogenous factors. The trade policy, 
which is endogenously determined, influences trade profile indicators. They consist of a wide 
range of indicators ranging from tariffs for the most favoured nations to the current account. 
The study proposes that these trade profile indicators lead to a WTO member country to lodge 
a complaint at the WTO. 
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We start, in section 2, with Data- and methods. In section 3, we turn to the results obtained 
relationship between the WTO complaints and financial and  economic variables at the macro 
level. Section 4 concludes with a discussion.  
 
 
Section 2 Data and Methods: 
The main question addressed in this section is whether the results of the cross- section 
analysis of WTO members belonging to the first quadrant hold true for the time series data. 
The purpose is to check whether the regression analysis shows the same results for 
the time series data for a few selected countries. These few selected countries form a subset of 
the countries belonging to the first quadrant in the classification table number 1 . 
 










Quadrant 1  
Most active 
countries (32) 
Quadrant 2 (21) 53 
Non respondent 
countries 




Total 44 120 164* 
* As of December 2012, the total number is greater than 159 because there have been 
complaints lodged against several member countries of EU separately. 
 
The use of time series analysis allows bringing in the aspect of time dynamics into the static 
nature of the cross-sectional analysis, which is conducted for a point of time data as of 
December 2012. Whereas the time series analysis applied to individual countries covers the 
data period from 1995 to 2012.  
 
A group of four countries is selected for the time series analysis, namely Canada, EU, Japan 
and the, USA. The EU is not a political unified  country,  but it negotiates, files complains and 
responds as one front at the DSU and can be for that reason taken as representing one political 
entity.The main reason for the selection of four leading countries is based on their image as 
the exponents of free trade and hence their expected higher propensity to make use of the 
dispute settlement forum of the WTO which serves as an instrument to ensure the adherence 
to free trade. Moreover, these countries have formed a united front in the past WTO 
negotiation rounds against the other WTO members, which favoured protectionist policies.  
 
The countries have highest freedom trade as measured by the Heritage foundation in 2012, 
whereas the trade to GDP ration is not particularly very high and exceptional for this free 
trade exponents. The table 2 shows some key data 
Table 2  Key data for selected countries. 
 
Trade-GDP ratio 
Net barter terms of 
trade 
Trade freedom No. of complaints 
filed  by December 
2012 








All the EU countries  













The online available data on the WTO website for the complaints year wise and the  sectoral 
share of in the GDP, Current account balance and other indicators is taken. The data related to  
the Intellectual property rights (IPR),  the structural unemployment percentage is compiled 
from the online world bank data. The indicators such as the trade  freedom is taken from the 
website of the  Hertige foundation.  
The records of a few variables that turned out to be significant in the cross- section analysis 
are not available from a singular reliable source such as the World Bank for all the individual 
countries for the same time  period. One of the very variables with the high explanatory 
power, which lacked the records from 1995, is the IPR.  The earliest data recorded available 
for an individual country dates to the year 2005. For this reason another series of the 
regressions were needed to carry out to facilitate the comparison with cross- section results.  
 
The data relate to the thirty The WTO member country entities are taken. The list of countries 
is in the appendix 3 and the data for the time series for the four countries is in appendix 4. The 
EU consists of, as of today, twenty-eight countries,  is taken as one entity. This is because it is 
under this denomination that they file a complaint at the DSU. This has some consequences 
on the data availability; the data related to EU on current account balance is not available. 
Some of the data like that for IPR is available only from 2005 onwards.  
The reason for choosing these big four developed countries have often formed front during 
the WTO negotiations Canada, EU, Japan and the U.S.A. They are also active complainers. 
U.S.A. with 105 cases until the end of 2012 is the biggest complainer followed by the EU 
with 87 complaints, Canada by thirty-three complaints ranks third. Japan with 17 complaints 
is a just above the mean number of complaints, superseded by countries like India, Brazil and 
Mexico that have a larger number of complaints lodged than Japan.  
Another variable which is not available for the same time period is The GDP / trade ratio 
lacks in the time series analysis. That is one of the reasons why GDP is used as the 
independent variable. 
For all these variables, there is want of data  from a singular reliable source for the period 
under consideration, from the year 1995 to 2005 which makes it infeasible to compare. The 
data for IPR is available for the sources from 2005, the GDP, import share is available from 
1995.  
The GDP is highly correlated with the IPR and it is used in the correlation and regression 
from the year 1995.  
 
The Net terms of trade:  The persistent  correlation between GDP and aggregate number of 
complaints and the necessity to  have a variable which could potential indicate the economic 
power and  which directly could connect without being correlated with the GDP led to search 
or a trade related variable. That is the point when Net Terms of Trade come in . 
Appendix 2.  The Net barter terms of trade (NBTOT): S. Kasahara S. 2011 ,  UNCTAD 








, Whre  Px is the price of exports and Pm is the price of imports. 
  
The net barter terms of trade, henceforth NTT is  introduced in this analysis, but is not 
available at the EU level  because it is calculated at the national level. The USA is the only 
country which has NTT records from 1995.   
 
The table three shows the variables which are used in the analysis and their expected signs in 
the correlation. 
 
Table 3 Economic variables and the expected sign 
Variables Expected 
sign  
Share of Mfg in imports - 
Share of Mfg in exports + 
Structural unemployment  - 
Current account balance - 
FDI %GDP + 
GDPPC + 
Trade to GDP ratio + 
IPR payments + 
 
The basic political variables 
After processing the data and the consistent correlation coefficient, one additional step was 
taken to link the findings to the  year of election and  the political parties in power. The source 
of the data are the respective websites of the political parties. For the reasons, which are 








3 A Key features of the data 
 
1) Gross domestic product shows a positive correlation with the number of aggregate 
complaints for the data set of active WTO countries which have filed complaints and 
are respondents. Graph 1. 
2)  At the national level the four countries show a negative relationship with the number 
of yearly complaints against the GDPPC for that year. The graphs are shown in the 
country wise results 
3) The Net terms of trade show after double ridged effect, an inverted double u pattern 
(graph 2). Indicating  perhaps for  every individual country  an ideal range of net terms 
of trade when they are less inclined to file a complaint at the DSU. The four countries 
show the same inverted u pattern. 
 
Graph 1  GDP vs number of aggregate complaints 
 
 









Taking logarithm vies a very high correlation coefficient and shows a pattern tending to 
inverted u. 
After taking away the biggest complainer which may influence the results show s a clearly 




After normalizing the data  graph shows  a double ridged pattern, the one  likes most similar 






y = 8.035ln(x) - 89.088
R² = 0.4415
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In an earlier carried out explorative cross -section analysis, the results showed that, Trade to 
GDP ratio, IPR payments and manufacturing share in the import to be significant.  
Whereas IPR has a positive relationship with the number of complaints, the trade to GDP 
ratio and manufacturing share in the import has negative relationship, for a GDP / trade ratio 
it exhibits a weak negative relationship. To check whether these results apply we carried out 
first a simple correlation analysis and then regressed with the dependent variable  of the 
number of complaints per ear with the other variables like structural unemployment, 
manufacturing share in imports and IPR payments.  
 
 
This paragraph shows the results obtained the stepwise regression on cross- section data. 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the cross sectional analysis. The brackets after the 
variables show the coefficients and the significance level of the variables. This is used 
consistently throughout the paper.  The results of the stepwise regression analysis on the 
cross- section data related to first quadrant countries shows that IPR payments (0.887; 0.001), 
the share of manufacturing in the import (-0.263; 0.004) and trade to GDP ratio (-0.178; 
0.044) explain more than 90% of the variation in the dependent variable. These results are in 
appendix 1. This range of variables was used to to correlated with the time series for the four 
selected countries.  
The table 1 shows the different variables which turn out significant in correlation analysis for 
the year 1995 to 2012. 
Table 1: correlation results from 1995-2012 
No. of 
complaints 
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The correlation analysis carried out for the time series analysis shows the following results. 
For the USA the data GDPPC  along with the import of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP showed high correlation at an acceptable level of significance. For the EU an additional 
variable, structural employment opportunities along with the GDPPC, the import of goods and 
services turned out to be significant. From the data for Canada only the GDPPC emerged out 
to be the most correlated factor. While in Japan the IPR payment as well as IPR receipts 
shoed positive correlation with the number of aggregate complaints for the period 1995−2012. 
The signs are consistent with the theoretical expectation and across the countries. 
 
The results of the regression analysis, after processing these variables which turned out  
significant in correlation analysis are presented country wise in the following pages. 
 
The first set of results pertains to Intellectual property right payments IPR. It shows a  high 
positive relationship between the number of complaints and the IPR payments 
 
 
Graph  3 shows the strong positive relationship between the IPR payments 
















Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,916a ,840 ,832 8,872 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 8647,706 1 8647,706 109,868 ,000b 
Residual 1652,903 21 78,710 
  
Total 10300,609 22 
   
a. Dependent Variable: No. Of complaints 28 
b. Predictors: (Constant), IPR payments 30 countries 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 8,339 1,924 
 
4,335 ,000 
IPR payments 30 countries 7,774E-010 ,000 ,916 10,482 ,000 
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3. 1 The USA. 
 
 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 24.813 4.713   5.265 .000 
GDPPC USA .000 .000 -.721 -4.161 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: No. of complaints USA 
 
Table 2  USA: 1995 model 2 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .721a .520 .490 3.476 
2 .818b .669 .625 2.978 
a. Predictors: (Constant). GDPPC USA 
b. Predictors: (Constant). GDPPC USA. X of goods and services as % of GDP 
 
Table 3: USA: model from 2005 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -31.478 15.616  -2.016 .100 
X as % of GDP from 2005 -1.515 .903 -1.654 -1.679 .154 
GDPPC from 2005 USA .001 .001 2.019 2.049 .096 

























































































USA : WTO complaints and GDP 1995-2012
No of…




For the EU an additional variable, structural unemployment  (0.476,  0.046. ), along with the  
GDPPC (− 0.516, 0.028), the import of goods and services (−0. 509. 0.031) turned out to be 
significant. In stepwise regression GDPPc turned out significant. 
 
 Table 1 EU model for data From 1995 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 12.733 3.562  3.575 .003 
GDPPC EU .000 .000 -.516 -2.409 .028 
a. Dependent Variable: No. of complaints EU 
Table 2 EU model for data from 2005 
Model Summary 
  
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
  1 ,393a ,155 -,480 1,997 
  a. Predictors: (Constant), M of goods and services from 2005 EU, 
Struct UN from 2005 EU, IPR payments from 2005 EU 
  







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 









,150 1,167 ,063 ,129 ,904 





,042 ,400 ,058 ,105 ,921 
a. Dependent Variable: No. of complaints from 2005 EU 
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3.2.1 EU graph GDP vs no. of complaints 
The graph shows a negative correlationship between these two variables. 
 
 
3.2.2 EU graph Structural unemployment and no. of complaints 
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From the data  pertaining to 1995 for Canada only the GDPPC emerged out to be the most 
correlated factor (− 0.537, 0.021). For Canada GDPPC and structural employment 
opportunities turned out to be carrying the explanatory power of the model with the respective 
coefficient and the level of significance can be seen at following tables.  
 
Table 1 Canada for 1995 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.880 .965  4.020 .001 
GDPPC Canada -7.154E-005 .000 -.537 -2.549 .021 
a. Dependent Variable: No. of complaints Canada 
 
Table 2 Canda for 2005 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.868 .539  5.320 .002 
Struct UN from 2005 
Canada 
-3.197 .771 -.861 -4.146 .006 
2 
(Constant) .063 .826  .077 .942 
Struct UN from 2005 
Canada 
-4.583 .581 -1.234 -7.886 .001 
GDPPC from 2005 Canada 8.453E-005 .000 .572 3.657 .015 




3.3 Canada Graph 
The graph shows negative relationship between GDPPC and the number of complaints and 
mild positive relationship between the percentage import of goods and services in the GDP 
and the number of complaints. 






None of the factors  used in the analysis provided a good fit for the Japan for the year 1995-
2012.  The results of the regression analysis are shown in the table  the IPR payments (0.7116. 
0.048) were the most correlated factor showing a positive correlation with the number of 
complaints lodged during the period 2005−2012.  
 
 




Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -4.567 2.058  -2.219 .068 
IPR payments from 2005 
Japan 
2.899E-010 .000 .711 2.474 .048 




3.4 Graph Japan 
























































































Canada: WTO complaints and the vital trade indicators 
From 1995-2012
GDP per capita
M of goods and
services as % of GDP





The cross sectional analysis showed a positive relationship with GDP 30 countries shows with 
an adjusted regression coefficient of 0.806, which is positive and the strength is considered as 
strong.  
In  a stepwise regression IPR turned out to be showing a high regression coefficient 0.85, with 
an addition of share of  manufacturing in the import it increases to 0.88 and a subsequent 
addition of GDP/ trade ration is shows a sign of 0.90. Also, without the big complainents like 
the EU and USA the correlation between GDP and  no of complaints remains positive for the 
cross sectional data,  but shows a slight decrease in coefficient  0.408 instead of 0.434. 
These results of cross- section are partly reflected in the time series results. The correlation 
coefficient is for the GDP and number of complaints is negative for the Candada, EU, USA 
and marginally positive for Japan.  
 
The correlation analysis carried out for the time series analysis showed some interesting 
results. For the U.S.A. the gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) along with the import 
of goods and services as a percentage of GDP  showed high correlation at an acceptable level 
of significance at (−0, 721. 0.001) and (-0.627, 0.005 ) respectively. With an adjusted R 
square of 0.490 the GDPPC (−0. 721, 0.001) is able to explain the variation for the WTO 
complaints lodged by the USA. 
 
The used data for the EU does not show significant results. This however does not mean that 
there is no correlation or association. The composition of the EU has changed over time, so 
the corresponding GDP, which is not just a result of growth but also accession of new 
countries. The GDP is calculated at the EU level, but the IPR payments   which shows a 
negative relationship with  which could be related to this. A variable which was taken into 
account at the beginning like current account balance could not be taken into the analysis. The 
trade/GDP ratio showed some marginal contribution could not be used either in time series 
analysis.  
The IPR data available before 2005 from a singular source turned out to be problematic and 
the non availability  the data at EU level gives a lot of zeros. It is not due to the statistical 
zeros, because they are there but not available.  
While applying the correlation and regression for IPR variable, it turned out that for the EU 
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U.S. A and Japan it showed a positive sign as expected. For the correlation only Japan showed 
a moderately high correlation at 0.711 at 0.005 levels, which failed to yield significant good 
fit after processing for the regression.  
 
 For the EU and Canada. IPR payments showed a negative relationship with the number of 
aggregate complaints. While for U.S. A and Japan it showed a positive sign as expected. For 
the correlation only Japan showed a moderately high correlation at 0.711 at 0.005 levels, 
which failed to yield significant good fit after processing for the regression.  
 
The USA. The EU and Canada show a correlation and dependence with GDPPC for Japan, 
there is a high correlation between IPR payment and GDPPC but GDPPc does not show 
correlation with the number of complaints lodged. The interdependence correlation coefficient 
among these three variables is not significant which implies that there is hardly any need to 
solve any problem of collinearity. The signs for all these three predictor variables are 
consistent with the expectation. The sign for IPR payments was expected to be positive due to 
its impact on the outflow of the money capital. The expected sign for the share of 
manufacturing imports as a percentage of GDP was expected to be negative. The justification 
for the negative sign is that the impact of  the high percentage of manufacturing imports  
implies dependency in the secondary sector,  usually an organized sector. On the similar lines, 
a higher trade to GDP ratio shows an open economy with higher depending on the trading 
partners. The strong coefficient and the higher level of significance favour the choice of IPR 
payments as the singular most important explanatory variable among the first quadrant 
countries 
Add graph 1. 
The graph one  shows clearly a double ridge effect for the countries belonging to the quadrant 
one. It shows a recurrence of the inverted U pattern,  indicating a nonlinear relationship 
between the net barter terms of trade and the complaints at the WTO.  To be specific the 
relationship between the net barter terms of trade and the complaints at the WTO showed a 
polynomial relationship, but,  because the yet to be estimated parameter is unknown in the 
regression function, it could be considered as linear. Accordingly.  A trend line for linear 
relationship was estimated.  The equation yielded proposes the value of y = -0.0348x +15.998. 
The constant, the y intercept, is negative and marginal.  
 
For EU a similar equation failed to yield owing to the issues related to the data comparison. 
The EU represents, negotiates and files complaint on behalf of all its member states, but the 
net barter terms of trade are available only at the member state level. This would imply the 
same number of EU complaints at the WTO level to be plotted against the net barter terms of 
trade for each of the twenty-eight current member states. To complicate the matter, the EU 
membership has seen an increasing trend over the years while EU representation at the WTO 
has varied over the time. This does not facilitate the sound comparison.  
The lack of uniformity in terms of the number of years for which the data is available makes 
the comparison more complicated.  
 
Double ridged effect 
 
The omission of  the  big four Canada, EU, Japan and USA from cross section an analysis 
shows a marginal reduction in the correlation coefficient between GDP and aggregate number 
of complaint and it is good and stronger for nonlinear function. There are many examples in 
economics which are nonlinear. The persistence of this  pattern led to a search of a variable 
which is related to trade and show some potential indication of the economic power.  For this 
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set of countries the NTT is not correlated to the GDP nor there is a significant linear 
correlation with the number of complaints.  
The double ridged effect observed in the cross sectional sample holds also to the three 
individual members.The expectation that the economically developed countries like Canada. 
Japan and the USA should find themselves on the right ridge of the diagram 1 owing to better 
net terms of trade is hardly observable in the data. The countries like Brazil and India are on 
the right side of the ridge showing a much lesser oscillation than Canada. Japan and the US.A. 
These three economically developed countries show high variation in the net barter terms of 
trade with a difference being more than forty points during the duration of seven years. 
 
To answer the main question, based on the results, that there is hardly any reason to believe 
that the complaints at the DSU are random. The DSU procedure has been considered as an 
innovative measure. The results show that there is some systematic pattern to believe that 
there could be some macroeconomic factors, which may be a culmination of various 
endogenous and exogenous factors that could condition the initial steps of the national 
government to file the complaints at the DSU despite the complicated and complex 
procedures to discourage the ungrounded complaints.  
 
At the cross sectional level, there is a positive relationship between the GDP and the number 
of aggregate complaints. The larger countries trade more, the richer countries trade more that 
could probably provide them more threats to the exposure of the trade barriers. At the national 
level, whether a very weak correlation there is a negative correction between the  number of 
aggregate complaints lodged and the GDP 2012. These complaining  countries are not likely 
to complain when their GDP  is lower. 
 The IPR payments which n stepwise and enter method is a good indicator, highly significant 
in cross -section analysis. The data is not available for a long time, which makes it less 
meaningful. 
 
Link 1 and link 3 USA 
 
The results are in appendix  IV. 
 
There are two political variables include on the election year and the party in power. The 
party is power is highly negatively correlated with IPR payments 0.805 at the 0.05 % level. If 
this IPR is taken as dependent variable the adjusted coefficient is 0.589 is significant. 
 
For Japan GDPPC is correlated with party in power with a 0.558 correlation coefficient the  
adjusted regression coefficient is mildly  with 0.268. 
 Canada GDPPC is highly correlated with 0.909 and with high adjusted regression coefficient 
0.8. These results are high, but should be cautiously interpreted. The trend for GDPPC has  
been in general to increase and with  almost with the exception of three years there has been 
one party in power in Jpana. For Canada after years among two parties are almost equally 
divided for the period under consideration.  
The political party variable in combination with the macro economic indicators can explain 
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Summary of the results 
On the basis of the quantitative analysis the summarized as follows: 
 A nonlinear, an inverted U relationship can be established between the GDP and the 
number of aggregate complaints for the year 2012 for the most active WTO member 
countries. 
 At cross sectional level, there is a positive relationship between the aggregate number 
of complaints and the GDP 
 At cross sectional level, there is a positive relationship between the aggregate number 
of complaints and the IPR payments. 
 At cross sectional level, the NTT and the aggregate number of complaints show a 
double ridged pattern, a double inverted U pattern, which also applies to the time 
series analysis indicating an ideal NTT  at which countries do not file a complaint. 
  For the USA, Canada and EU there is a negative correlation between a number of 
complaints and the GDP. 
 For Canada structural unemployment and for Japan IPR payments turn out to be very 
important explaining factors. 
 The quantitative analysis shows that political party in power could have some direct 
role in the  level of IPR, GDP and  indirect role in the complaints at the DSU. 
It can be concluded that the complaints at the DSU have quantitatively provable dependence 
on the trade profile indicators. The complaints at the DSU are no independent of the 
endogenous factors of a country. This could be probably be due tot the barrier effect of the 
DSU complaints. It is too premature at this stage to conclude that because the research is still 
going on. 
Discussion: 
This study is the first step in the research and research  will continue  to probe into the 
protectionist effect on the complaining countries and the regional variations in the pattern of 
use of the DSU procedure.  
This study is based on the macro factors, using aggregates and that is one of the major 
limitation of the paper, it  looks at the problematic form purely quantitative perspective. 
The results in this paper provide fertile ground for more questions than it answers.  
The analysis is limited to the macroeconomic indicators, though it does recognize, but does 
not include in its analysis the political dynamics, as can be seen from the conceptual model. 
That is exactly the factors and process which the WTO and DSU did not wish to take into 
account, the aim being providing trade justice by making the trade accessible to all the 
countries, whether rich or poor. It is the pure breach of trade agreement that should lead to the  
complaint at the DSU. The conceptual model shows that there is a link possible to expect it 
otherwise.  Do the WTO complaints have protectionist impact. The process, effects and 
consequences after a complaint has been filed at the WTO. Does it halt the trade with 
immediate effect until the matter is settled?  
 
  
Key features of the proposed conceptual model is the connection with the active lobbyist 
network and the implicit role of the government’s two-dimensional conflicting objectives. 
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The two-dimensional conflicting objectives, which imply an optimal policy, which intends to 
equilibrate with its own political objective of retaining the power and that of the government, 
in its role of representatives of the citizens, to optimize the welfare. The national governments 
file the complaints, but they are related to  not to a firm level, though an individual firm might 
get affected by it ,  related to a product and therefore have bearing upon at sector level.  
 
 
The results of the analysis lead us to believe that the approach adopted for the analysis could 
only be used for exploratory analysis and not to obtain an impact of the DSU procedure that a 
respondent country may or may not face. The main problem is that an analysis that requires 
information on the impact of the DSU complaint is not going to be very precise regarding 
specific details of the steps in the DSU procedure. This means that it will be difficult to link 
the steps in DSU procedure to specific effects in the complaining country. On the other hand, 
the analysis procedure was found to be useful in determining the response of a respondent 
country to the WTO complaints their relative importance and potential solution. 
It it feasible that in many cases. The poor understanding of trade agreement that is perceived 
as NTB in combination with the weak understanding of the multi-lateral trade agreement 
resulted in a complaint at the DSU.  
 
 
As revealed by a casual examination of the seventeen years’ time series indicates, the 
viewpoint of many analysts has been and remains an event-based approach in which one 
attempts to rationalize a given trade liberalization policy by relating it to a national or 
international economic or political event. From this point of view, one could infer that, since 
the different WTO complaint are not necessarily influenced by the same events or 
information sets, the WTO complaints obtained from several countries for the different years 
will exhibit different features. 
The industries at home are either organized or unorganized. The industries organized or 
otherwise, may or may not perceive the alleged long-term benefits from multilateral trade. It 
could put pressure on the government by providing political support or providing election 
contributions. The displaced labors might organize protests and create social unrest in the 
concerned area. The threatened displacement of the villagers, residents or ground, farms could 
also be a part of such consequences. The non-ruling parties might fuel up the protest against 
the ruling party’s decisions to gain its political share in the winning.  
 
The government of the ruling parties needs to keep its status and want to retain its power. The 
authorities might prone to take decisions for the short-term political gains in favour of the 
alleged long-term economic free trade gains. At the same time, the commitments to the WTO 
are the signals to the business world about the intention and willingness of the country for the 
principles of multilateral trade. The reversal in the short term to the WTO commitments is an 
exception. The government faces a dilemma and in order to prove its commitment to the 
stakeholders who are directly or indirectly affected by such multilateral trade effect, to win 
the political arena may take certain political steps in the international trade arena. This step 
could be to complain at the WTO. 
 
Several areas deserve further investigation the research is ongoing and this paper covers only 
a part of it. To the extent that the WTO promotes free trade by requiring most favoured nation 
MFN’and reduction of non tariff trade barriers NTB it would be helpful to have a better 
understanding of the impact of MFN itself. As it turns out, some countries extend MFN more 
broadly and reduce NTB extensively expecting it from the other countries to do the same. At 
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the moment, no comprehensive source of NTB data exists about who grants a reduction of 
NTB to whom. The collection of such data would represent a major contribution to our 
understanding of WTO complaints. Such work would also shed light on countries and their 
differential treatment of granting a reduction of NTB.   
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 The cross- section factors did not turn out to be relevant equally for all the countries and to 
the same extent. 
 
Model Summary 
   




Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
   1 .926a .857 .849 8.941 
   2 .947b .896 .884 7.839 
   3 .960c .922 .906 7.042 
   a. Predictors: (Constant). IPR payments 30 countries 
   b. Predictors: (Constant). IPR payments 30 countries. Mfg 
M share in 30 countries 
   c. Predictors: (Constant). IPR payments 30 countries. Mfg 
M share in 30 countries. GDP/Trade ratio 
   






Square F Sig. 
 1 Regression 8139.737 1 8139.737 101.829 .000b 
 Residual 1358.895 17 79.935     
 Total 9498.632 18       
 2 Regression 8515.422 2 4257.711 69.287 .000c 
 Residual 983.209 16 61.451     
 Total 9498.632 18       
 3 Regression 8754.751 3 2918.250 58.845 .000d 
 Residual 743.880 15 49.592     
 Total 9498.632 18       
 a. Dependent Variable: No. Of complaints 28 
 b. Predictors: (Constant). IPR payments 30 countries 
 c. Predictors: (Constant). IPR payments 30 countries. Mfg M share in 30 
countries 
 d. Predictors: (Constant). IPR payments 30 countries. Mfg M share in 30 
countries. GDP/Trade ratio 
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7.599E-10 .000 .926 10.091 .000 





7.661E-10 .000 .933 11.595 .000 
 Mfg M 
share in 30 
countries 
-.570 .230 -.199 -2.473 .025 





7.284E-10 .000 .887 11.788 .000 
 Mfg M 
share in 30 
countries 
-.751 .223 -.263 -3.371 .004 
 GDP/Trade 
ratio 




The regression results are  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,979a ,958 ,950 5,043 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FDI %GDP, structural unProblem, IPR 
payment 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 9744,962 3 3248,321 127,746 ,000b 
Residual 432,276 17 25,428   
Total 10177,238 20    
a. Dependent Variable: Complaints by 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FDI %GDP, structural unProblem, IPR payment 





Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 5,924 1,875  3,160 ,006 
IPR payment 1,916E-009 ,000 ,735 3,883 ,001 
structural unProblem -,323 ,148 -,231 -2,189 ,043 
FDI %GDP ,000 ,000 ,316 1,818 ,087 
































C:\Shilpa Delen\Shilpa 2014 Feb 
kopie\SIEL 2014\WTO data 31  
most active countries April 
2014.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 45 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics for each pair of variables 
are based on all the cases with 
valid data for that pair. 
Syntax 
CORRELATIONS 
  /VARIABLES=VAR00072 
VAR00069 VAR00029 VAR00031 
  /PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG 
  /MISSING=PAIRWISE. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00,00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00,01 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Shilpa Delen\Shilpa 2014 Feb kopie\SIEL 2014\WTO data 31  
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 Net barter terms of 
trade 31 
Trade to GDP ratio 
complainants 
GDP 30 countries No. Of complaints 
28 
Net barter terms of trade 31 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,186 -,174 -,078 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,334 ,366 ,686 
N 29 29 29 29 
Trade to GDP ratio complainants 
Pearson Correlation ,186 1 ,371* ,323 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,334  ,044 ,082 
N 29 30 30 30 
GDP 30 countries 
Pearson Correlation -,174 ,371* 1 ,901** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,366 ,044  ,000 
N 29 30 30 30 
No. Of complaints 28 
Pearson Correlation -,078 ,323 ,901** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,686 ,082 ,000  
N 29 30 30 30 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




 Net barter terms 
of trade 31 
Trade to GDP 
ratio 
complainants 
GDP 30 countries No. Of complaints 
28 
Net barter terms of trade 31 
Pearson 
Correlation 




,334 ,366 ,686 
N 29 29 29 29 
Trade to GDP ratio complainants 
Pearson 
Correlation 






N 29 30 30 30 
GDP 30 countries 
Pearson 
Correlation 






N 29 30 30 30 
No. Of complaints 28 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,078 ,323 ,901** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,686 ,082 ,000 
 
N 29 30 30 30 
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*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 





Net barter terms 
of trade 31 







1 ,186 -,174 -,078 
 ,334 ,366 ,686 
29 29 29 29 
,186 1 ,371* ,323 
,334  ,044 ,082 
29 30 30 30 
-,174 ,371* 1 ,901** 
,366 ,044  ,000 
29 30 30 30 
-,078 ,323 ,901** 1 
,686 ,082 ,000  





















GDP 30 countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 .901** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 30 30 
No. Of complaints 28 
Pearson Correlation .901** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
The draft paper SIEL June 2014   Shilpa Samplonius 
 
 
N 30 30 




Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .901a .813 .806 10.498 
















 GDP 30 countries No. Of complaints 
28 
GDP 30 countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 .901** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 30 30 
No. Of complaints 28 
Pearson Correlation .901** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 30 30 







[DataSet1] C:\Shilpa Delen\Shilpa 2014 Feb kopie\SIEL 2014\WTO data 31  
most active countries April 2014.sav 
 






Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 GDP 30 countriesb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: No. Of complaints 28 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .901a .813 .806 10.498 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 13387.551 1 13387.551 121.476 .000b 
Residual 3085.815 28 110.208   
Total 16473.367 29    
a. Dependent Variable: No. Of complaints 28 




Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 4.517 2.123  2.128 .042 
GDP 30 countries 5.062E-006 .000 .901 11.022 .000 





[DataSet1] C:\Shilpa Delen\Shilpa 2014 Feb kopie\SIEL 2014\WTO data 31   
 
Correlations 
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GDP 30 countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 .888** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 30 23 
IPR payments 30 countries 
Pearson Correlation .888** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 23 23 




Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .916a .840 .832 8.872 
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Korea, Republic of 
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Malaysia 
19 Mexico 
20 
Moldova 
21 
Nicaragua 
22 
Pakistan 
23 
Panama 
24 
Poland 
25 
Thailand 
26 Turkey 
27 Ukraine 
28 
United States 
29 
Uruguay 
30 
Venezuela, 
Bolivarian Republic 
of 
 
